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Fix CVE-2020-25654

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(cherry picked from commit e296028a16c9409ffe968e80b95b6befc8d0a212)
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jxy_git 2022-09-03 16:39:14 +08:00 committed by openeuler-sync-bot
parent 9d5c997b91
commit c6329c3357
2 changed files with 523 additions and 1 deletions
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514
CVE-2020-25654.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,514 @@
From 3d1a7dc0c545c1ffba216df5c82b5ee3e3c7b3bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 09:56:03 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/7] Log: executor: show CRM_OP_REGISTER rc in debug message
Previously, process_lrmd_signon() would add the rc to the client reply
but not pass it back to process_lrmd_message(), which would always log "OK" in
its debug message, even if the sign-on was rejected.
---
daemons/execd/execd_commands.c | 21 +++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/daemons/execd/execd_commands.c b/daemons/execd/execd_commands.c
index 9ded90c..aadbc4d 100644
--- a/daemons/execd/execd_commands.c
+++ b/daemons/execd/execd_commands.c
@@ -1517,10 +1517,10 @@ free_rsc(gpointer data)
free(rsc);
}
-static xmlNode *
-process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t *client, xmlNode *request, int call_id)
+static int
+process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t *client, xmlNode *request, int call_id,
+ xmlNode **reply)
{
- xmlNode *reply = NULL;
int rc = pcmk_ok;
const char *is_ipc_provider = crm_element_value(request, F_LRMD_IS_IPC_PROVIDER);
const char *protocol_version = crm_element_value(request, F_LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
@@ -1531,18 +1531,19 @@ process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t *client, xmlNode *request, int call_id)
rc = -EPROTO;
}
- reply = create_lrmd_reply(__FUNCTION__, rc, call_id);
- crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_OPERATION, CRM_OP_REGISTER);
- crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_CLIENTID, client->id);
- crm_xml_add(reply, F_LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
-
if (crm_is_true(is_ipc_provider)) {
// This is a remote connection from a cluster node's controller
#ifdef SUPPORT_REMOTE
ipc_proxy_add_provider(client);
#endif
}
- return reply;
+
+ *reply = create_lrmd_reply(__func__, rc, call_id);
+ crm_xml_add(*reply, F_LRMD_OPERATION, CRM_OP_REGISTER);
+ crm_xml_add(*reply, F_LRMD_CLIENTID, client->id);
+ crm_xml_add(*reply, F_LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, LRMD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+
+ return rc;
}
static int
@@ -1854,7 +1855,7 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
#endif
do_reply = 1;
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, CRM_OP_REGISTER, TRUE)) {
- reply = process_lrmd_signon(client, request, call_id);
+ rc = process_lrmd_signon(client, request, call_id, &reply);
do_reply = 1;
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_REG, TRUE)) {
rc = process_lrmd_rsc_register(client, id, request);
--
1.8.3.1
From d4cc1949292aaa42368e2871a04e67f65f22c154 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 15:16:39 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Low: executor: mark controller connections to
pacemaker-remoted as privileged
Previously, crm_client_flag_ipc_privileged was only set when local clients connected
(as root or hacluster). Now, set it when pacemaker-remoted successfully
completes the TLS handshake with a remote client (i.e., the controller on a
cluster node).
This has no effect as of this commit but will with later commits.
---
daemons/execd/remoted_tls.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/daemons/execd/remoted_tls.c b/daemons/execd/remoted_tls.c
index cd7cbe5..ea9cf3e 100644
--- a/daemons/execd/remoted_tls.c
+++ b/daemons/execd/remoted_tls.c
@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ remoted__read_handshake_data(crm_client_t *client)
client->remote->tls_handshake_complete = TRUE;
crm_notice("Remote client connection accepted");
+ /* Only a client with access to the TLS key can connect, so we can treat
+ * it as privileged.
+ */
+ set_bit(client->flags, crm_client_flag_ipc_privileged);
+
// Alert other clients of the new connection
notify_of_new_client(client);
return 0;
--
1.8.3.1
From bb6ae415a534fa9f1bd1ec06e0a0b4c64b1e8530 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 15:33:13 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Low: executor: return appropriate error code when no
remote support
---
daemons/execd/execd_commands.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/daemons/execd/execd_commands.c b/daemons/execd/execd_commands.c
index aadbc4d..84e9c40 100644
--- a/daemons/execd/execd_commands.c
+++ b/daemons/execd/execd_commands.c
@@ -1532,9 +1532,11 @@ process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t *client, xmlNode *request, int call_id,
}
if (crm_is_true(is_ipc_provider)) {
- // This is a remote connection from a cluster node's controller
#ifdef SUPPORT_REMOTE
+ // This is a remote connection from a cluster node's controller
ipc_proxy_add_provider(client);
+#else
+ rc = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
#endif
}
@@ -1852,6 +1854,8 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
if (crm_str_eq(op, CRM_OP_IPC_FWD, TRUE)) {
#ifdef SUPPORT_REMOTE
ipc_proxy_forward_client(client, request);
+#else
+ rc = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
#endif
do_reply = 1;
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, CRM_OP_REGISTER, TRUE)) {
--
1.8.3.1
From 6fdf576fe506837099561a0fc6409fc315a9f2b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 15:33:57 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 4/7] High: executor: restrict certain IPC requests to
Pacemaker daemons
The executor IPC API allows clients to register resources, request agent
execution, and so forth.
If ACLs are enabled, this could allow an ACL-restricted user to bypass ACLs and
execute any code as root. (If ACLs are not enabled, users in the haclient group
have full access to the CIB, which already gives them that ability, so there is
no additional exposure in that case.)
When ACLs are supported, this commit effectively disables the executor IPC API
for clients that aren't connecting as root or hacluster. Such clients can only
register and poke now.
---
daemons/execd/execd_commands.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/daemons/execd/execd_commands.c b/daemons/execd/execd_commands.c
index 84e9c40..e217ce7 100644
--- a/daemons/execd/execd_commands.c
+++ b/daemons/execd/execd_commands.c
@@ -1533,8 +1533,12 @@ process_lrmd_signon(crm_client_t *client, xmlNode *request, int call_id,
if (crm_is_true(is_ipc_provider)) {
#ifdef SUPPORT_REMOTE
- // This is a remote connection from a cluster node's controller
- ipc_proxy_add_provider(client);
+ if ((client->remote != NULL) && client->remote->tls_handshake_complete) {
+ // This is a remote connection from a cluster node's controller
+ ipc_proxy_add_provider(client);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
#else
rc = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
#endif
@@ -1848,12 +1852,26 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
int do_notify = 0;
xmlNode *reply = NULL;
+ bool allowed = true;
+
+#if ENABLE_ACL
+ /* Certain IPC commands may be done only by privileged users (i.e. root or
+ * hacluster) when ACLs are enabled, because they would otherwise provide a
+ * means of bypassing ACLs.
+ */
+ allowed = is_set(client->flags, crm_client_flag_ipc_privileged);
+#endif
+
crm_trace("Processing %s operation from %s", op, client->id);
crm_element_value_int(request, F_LRMD_CALLID, &call_id);
if (crm_str_eq(op, CRM_OP_IPC_FWD, TRUE)) {
#ifdef SUPPORT_REMOTE
- ipc_proxy_forward_client(client, request);
+ if (allowed) {
+ ipc_proxy_forward_client(client, request);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
#else
rc = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
#endif
@@ -1862,38 +1880,70 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
rc = process_lrmd_signon(client, request, call_id, &reply);
do_reply = 1;
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_REG, TRUE)) {
- rc = process_lrmd_rsc_register(client, id, request);
- do_notify = 1;
+ if (allowed) {
+ rc = process_lrmd_rsc_register(client, id, request);
+ do_notify = 1;
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
do_reply = 1;
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_INFO, TRUE)) {
- reply = process_lrmd_get_rsc_info(request, call_id);
+ if (allowed) {
+ reply = process_lrmd_get_rsc_info(request, call_id);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
do_reply = 1;
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_UNREG, TRUE)) {
- rc = process_lrmd_rsc_unregister(client, id, request);
- /* don't notify anyone about failed un-registers */
- if (rc == pcmk_ok || rc == -EINPROGRESS) {
- do_notify = 1;
+ if (allowed) {
+ rc = process_lrmd_rsc_unregister(client, id, request);
+ /* don't notify anyone about failed un-registers */
+ if (rc == pcmk_ok || rc == -EINPROGRESS) {
+ do_notify = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
}
do_reply = 1;
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_EXEC, TRUE)) {
- rc = process_lrmd_rsc_exec(client, id, request);
+ if (allowed) {
+ rc = process_lrmd_rsc_exec(client, id, request);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
do_reply = 1;
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_RSC_CANCEL, TRUE)) {
- rc = process_lrmd_rsc_cancel(client, id, request);
+ if (allowed) {
+ rc = process_lrmd_rsc_cancel(client, id, request);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
do_reply = 1;
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_POKE, TRUE)) {
do_notify = 1;
do_reply = 1;
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_CHECK, TRUE)) {
- xmlNode *data = get_message_xml(request, F_LRMD_CALLDATA);
- const char *timeout = crm_element_value(data, F_LRMD_WATCHDOG);
- CRM_LOG_ASSERT(data != NULL);
- check_sbd_timeout(timeout);
+ if (allowed) {
+ xmlNode *data = get_message_xml(request, F_LRMD_CALLDATA);
+
+ CRM_LOG_ASSERT(data != NULL);
+ check_sbd_timeout(crm_element_value(data, F_LRMD_WATCHDOG));
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_ALERT_EXEC, TRUE)) {
- rc = process_lrmd_alert_exec(client, id, request);
+ if (allowed) {
+ rc = process_lrmd_alert_exec(client, id, request);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
do_reply = 1;
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, LRMD_OP_GET_RECURRING, TRUE)) {
- reply = process_lrmd_get_recurring(request, call_id);
+ if (allowed) {
+ reply = process_lrmd_get_recurring(request, call_id);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
do_reply = 1;
} else {
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -1902,6 +1952,11 @@ process_lrmd_message(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, xmlNode * request)
crm_log_xml_warn(request, "UnknownOp");
}
+ if (rc == -EACCES) {
+ crm_warn("Rejecting IPC request '%s' from unprivileged client %s",
+ op, crm_client_name(client));
+ }
+
crm_debug("Processed %s operation from %s: rc=%d, reply=%d, notify=%d",
op, client->id, rc, do_reply, do_notify);
--
1.8.3.1
From 38397e6a04a4b8a16771e57b5b19fc0f7111063b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 11:16:43 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Low: pacemakerd: check client for NULL before using it
... to guard against bugs in client tracking
---
daemons/pacemakerd/pacemakerd.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/daemons/pacemakerd/pacemakerd.c b/daemons/pacemakerd/pacemakerd.c
index d8ff53d..278b48b 100644
--- a/daemons/pacemakerd/pacemakerd.c
+++ b/daemons/pacemakerd/pacemakerd.c
@@ -560,9 +560,12 @@ pcmk_ipc_dispatch(qb_ipcs_connection_t * qbc, void *data, size_t size)
uint32_t id = 0;
uint32_t flags = 0;
const char *task = NULL;
+ xmlNode *msg = NULL;
crm_client_t *c = crm_client_get(qbc);
- xmlNode *msg = crm_ipcs_recv(c, data, size, &id, &flags);
+ CRM_CHECK(c != NULL, return 0);
+
+ msg = crm_ipcs_recv(c, data, size, &id, &flags);
crm_ipcs_send_ack(c, id, flags, "ack", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
if (msg == NULL) {
return 0;
--
1.8.3.1
From 03d1f5861229b3b28728fa0eabfc99ddc9bccaa4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 11:17:18 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 6/7] High: pacemakerd: ignore shutdown requests from
unprivileged users
The pacemakerd IPC API supports a shutdown request, along with a
command-line interface for using it (pacemakerd --shutdown).
Only the haclient group has access to the IPC. Without ACLs, that group can
already shut down Pacemaker via the CIB, so there's no security implication.
However, it might not be desired to allow ACL-restricted users to shut down
Pacemaker, so block users other than root or hacluster if ACLs are supported.
---
daemons/pacemakerd/pacemakerd.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/daemons/pacemakerd/pacemakerd.c b/daemons/pacemakerd/pacemakerd.c
index 278b48b..ebb14e8 100644
--- a/daemons/pacemakerd/pacemakerd.c
+++ b/daemons/pacemakerd/pacemakerd.c
@@ -573,10 +573,26 @@ pcmk_ipc_dispatch(qb_ipcs_connection_t * qbc, void *data, size_t size)
task = crm_element_value(msg, F_CRM_TASK);
if (crm_str_eq(task, CRM_OP_QUIT, TRUE)) {
- /* Time to quit */
- crm_notice("Shutting down in response to ticket %s (%s)",
- crm_element_value(msg, F_CRM_REFERENCE), crm_element_value(msg, F_CRM_ORIGIN));
- pcmk_shutdown(15);
+ bool allowed = true;
+
+#if ENABLE_ACL
+ /* Only allow privileged users (i.e. root or hacluster)
+ * to shut down Pacemaker from the command line (or direct IPC).
+ *
+ * We only check when ACLs are enabled, because without them, any client
+ * with IPC access could shut down Pacemaker via the CIB anyway.
+ */
+ allowed = is_set(c->flags, crm_client_flag_ipc_privileged);
+#endif
+ if (allowed) {
+ crm_notice("Shutting down in response to IPC request %s from %s",
+ crm_element_value(msg, F_CRM_REFERENCE),
+ crm_element_value(msg, F_CRM_ORIGIN));
+ pcmk_shutdown(15);
+ } else {
+ crm_warn("Ignoring shutdown request from unprivileged client %s",
+ crm_client_name(c));
+ }
} else if (crm_str_eq(task, CRM_OP_RM_NODE_CACHE, TRUE)) {
/* Send to everyone */
--
1.8.3.1
From 5fcb1e923d2e900da672306fb82a946a0af5e641 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ken Gaillot <kgaillot@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 11:55:26 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 7/7] Fix: fencer: restrict certain IPC requests to privileged
users
The fencer IPC API allows clients to register fence devices.
If ACLs are enabled, this could allow an ACL-restricted user to bypass ACLs to
configure fencing. If the user is able to install executables to the standard
fencing agent locations, have arbitrary code executed as root (the standard
locations generally require root for write access, so that is unlikely to be an
issue).
If ACLs are not enabled, users in the haclient group have full access to the
CIB, which already gives them these capabilities, so there is no additional
exposure in that case.
This commit does not restrict unprivileged users from using other fencing API,
such as requesting actual fencing.
---
daemons/fenced/fenced_commands.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/daemons/fenced/fenced_commands.c b/daemons/fenced/fenced_commands.c
index 9d3f924..d965d7c 100644
--- a/daemons/fenced/fenced_commands.c
+++ b/daemons/fenced/fenced_commands.c
@@ -2455,6 +2455,18 @@ handle_request(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, uint32_t flags, xmlNode * req
const char *op = crm_element_value(request, F_STONITH_OPERATION);
const char *client_id = crm_element_value(request, F_STONITH_CLIENTID);
+ bool allowed = true;
+
+#if ENABLE_ACL
+ /* IPC commands related to fencing configuration may be done only by
+ * privileged users (i.e. root or hacluster) when ACLs are supported,
+ * because all other users should go through the CIB to have ACLs applied.
+ */
+ if (client != NULL) {
+ allowed = is_set(client->flags, crm_client_flag_ipc_privileged);
+ }
+#endif
+
crm_element_value_int(request, F_STONITH_CALLOPTS, &call_options);
if (is_set(call_options, st_opt_sync_call)) {
@@ -2604,27 +2616,43 @@ handle_request(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, uint32_t flags, xmlNode * req
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, STONITH_OP_DEVICE_ADD, TRUE)) {
const char *device_id = NULL;
- rc = stonith_device_register(request, &device_id, FALSE);
+ if (allowed) {
+ rc = stonith_device_register(request, &device_id, FALSE);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
do_stonith_notify_device(call_options, op, rc, device_id);
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, STONITH_OP_DEVICE_DEL, TRUE)) {
xmlNode *dev = get_xpath_object("//" F_STONITH_DEVICE, request, LOG_ERR);
const char *device_id = crm_element_value(dev, XML_ATTR_ID);
- rc = stonith_device_remove(device_id, FALSE);
+ if (allowed) {
+ rc = stonith_device_remove(device_id, FALSE);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
do_stonith_notify_device(call_options, op, rc, device_id);
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, STONITH_OP_LEVEL_ADD, TRUE)) {
char *device_id = NULL;
- rc = stonith_level_register(request, &device_id);
+ if (allowed) {
+ rc = stonith_level_register(request, &device_id);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
do_stonith_notify_level(call_options, op, rc, device_id);
free(device_id);
} else if (crm_str_eq(op, STONITH_OP_LEVEL_DEL, TRUE)) {
char *device_id = NULL;
- rc = stonith_level_remove(request, &device_id);
+ if (allowed) {
+ rc = stonith_level_remove(request, &device_id);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
do_stonith_notify_level(call_options, op, rc, device_id);
} else if(safe_str_eq(op, CRM_OP_RM_NODE_CACHE)) {
@@ -2644,6 +2672,11 @@ handle_request(crm_client_t * client, uint32_t id, uint32_t flags, xmlNode * req
done:
+ if (rc == -EACCES) {
+ crm_warn("Rejecting IPC request '%s' from unprivileged client %s",
+ crm_str(op), crm_client_name(client));
+ }
+
/* Always reply unless the request is in process still.
* If in progress, a reply will happen async after the request
* processing is finished */
--
1.8.3.1

10
pacemaker.spec
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
## can be incremented to build packages reliably considered "newer"
## than previously built packages with the same pcmkversion)
%global pcmkversion 2.0.3
%global specversion 2
%global specversion 3
## Upstream commit (or git tag, such as "Pacemaker-" plus the
## {pcmkversion} macro for an official release) to use for this package
@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ Source1: https://github.com/%{github_owner}/%{nagios_name}/archive/%{nagio
# ---
Patch0: Build-fix-unability-to-build-with-Inkscape-1.0-beta-.patch
Patch1: Resolve-the-failure-of-time-matching-in-test-cases.patch
Patch2: CVE-2020-25654.patch
Requires: resource-agents
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
@ -339,6 +340,7 @@ monitor resources.
%__scm_setup_git
%patch0 -p1
%patch1 -p1
%patch2 -p1
%build
@ -701,6 +703,12 @@ exit 0
%license %{nagios_name}-%{nagios_hash}/COPYING
%changelog
* Sat Sep 03 2022 jiangxinyu <jiangxinyu@kylinos.cn> - 2.0.3-3
- Type:cves
- ID:CVE-2020-25654
- SUG:NA
- DESC:fix CVE-2020-25654
* Tue Mar 23 2021 jiangxinyu <jiangxinyu@kylinos.cn> - 2.0.3-2
- Add 'Resolve-the-failure-of-time-matching-in-test-cases.patch' file 2.0.3-2