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!130 fix CVE-2021-4189 CVE-2022-0391

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From: @tong_1001 
Reviewed-by: @hanxinke 
Signed-off-by: @hanxinke
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openeuler-ci-bot 2022-02-18 06:35:53 +00:00 committed by Gitee
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141
backport-CVE-2021-4189.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
From 79373951b3eab585d42e0f0ab83718cbe1d0ee33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2021 14:19:55 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] [3.7] bpo-43285 Make ftplib not trust the PASV response.
(GH-24838) (GH-24881) (GH-24883)
The IPv4 address value returned from the server in response to the PASV command
should not be trusted. This prevents a malicious FTP server from using the
response to probe IPv4 address and port combinations on the client network.
Instead of using the returned address, we use the IP address we're
already connected to. This is the strategy other ftp clients adopted,
and matches the only strategy available for the modern IPv6 EPSV command
where the server response must return a port number and nothing else.
For the rare user who _wants_ this ugly behavior, set a `trust_server_pasv_ipv4_address`
attribute on your `ftplib.FTP` instance to True..
(cherry picked from commit 0ab152c6b5d95caa2dc1a30fa96e10258b5f188e)
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
(cherry picked from commit 664d1d16274b47eea6ec92572e1ebf3939a6fa0c)
---
Doc/whatsnew/3.7.rst | 9 +++++++
Lib/ftplib.py | 9 ++++++-
Lib/test/test_ftplib.py | 27 ++++++++++++++++++-
.../2021-03-13-03-48-14.bpo-43285.g-Hah3.rst | 8 ++++++
4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-03-13-03-48-14.bpo-43285.g-Hah3.rst
diff --git a/Doc/whatsnew/3.7.rst b/Doc/whatsnew/3.7.rst
index 25e231dcc7dfa..85f924b2e41f3 100644
--- a/Doc/whatsnew/3.7.rst
+++ b/Doc/whatsnew/3.7.rst
@@ -2585,3 +2585,12 @@ separator key, with ``&`` as the default. This change also affects
functions internally. For more details, please see their respective
documentation.
(Contributed by Adam Goldschmidt, Senthil Kumaran and Ken Jin in :issue:`42967`.)
+
+Notable changes in Python 3.7.11
+================================
+
+A security fix alters the :class:`ftplib.FTP` behavior to not trust the
+IPv4 address sent from the remote server when setting up a passive data
+channel. We reuse the ftp server IP address instead. For unusual code
+requiring the old behavior, set a ``trust_server_pasv_ipv4_address``
+attribute on your FTP instance to ``True``. (See :issue:`43285`)
diff --git a/Lib/ftplib.py b/Lib/ftplib.py
index 9611282ecacb2..83ed0aa9c140e 100644
--- a/Lib/ftplib.py
+++ b/Lib/ftplib.py
@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ class FTP:
welcome = None
passiveserver = 1
encoding = "latin-1"
+ # Disables https://bugs.python.org/issue43285 security if set to True.
+ trust_server_pasv_ipv4_address = False
# Initialization method (called by class instantiation).
# Initialize host to localhost, port to standard ftp port
@@ -333,8 +335,13 @@ def makeport(self):
return sock
def makepasv(self):
+ """Internal: Does the PASV or EPSV handshake -> (address, port)"""
if self.af == socket.AF_INET:
- host, port = parse227(self.sendcmd('PASV'))
+ untrusted_host, port = parse227(self.sendcmd('PASV'))
+ if self.trust_server_pasv_ipv4_address:
+ host = untrusted_host
+ else:
+ host = self.sock.getpeername()[0]
else:
host, port = parse229(self.sendcmd('EPSV'), self.sock.getpeername())
return host, port
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_ftplib.py b/Lib/test/test_ftplib.py
index da8ba32917be7..73a6250a5e4ae 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_ftplib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_ftplib.py
@@ -94,6 +94,10 @@ def __init__(self, conn):
self.rest = None
self.next_retr_data = RETR_DATA
self.push('220 welcome')
+ # We use this as the string IPv4 address to direct the client
+ # to in response to a PASV command. To test security behavior.
+ # https://bugs.python.org/issue43285/.
+ self.fake_pasv_server_ip = '252.253.254.255'
def collect_incoming_data(self, data):
self.in_buffer.append(data)
@@ -136,7 +140,8 @@ def cmd_pasv(self, arg):
sock.bind((self.socket.getsockname()[0], 0))
sock.listen()
sock.settimeout(TIMEOUT)
- ip, port = sock.getsockname()[:2]
+ port = sock.getsockname()[1]
+ ip = self.fake_pasv_server_ip
ip = ip.replace('.', ','); p1 = port / 256; p2 = port % 256
self.push('227 entering passive mode (%s,%d,%d)' %(ip, p1, p2))
conn, addr = sock.accept()
@@ -698,6 +703,26 @@ def test_makepasv(self):
# IPv4 is in use, just make sure send_epsv has not been used
self.assertEqual(self.server.handler_instance.last_received_cmd, 'pasv')
+ def test_makepasv_issue43285_security_disabled(self):
+ """Test the opt-in to the old vulnerable behavior."""
+ self.client.trust_server_pasv_ipv4_address = True
+ bad_host, port = self.client.makepasv()
+ self.assertEqual(
+ bad_host, self.server.handler_instance.fake_pasv_server_ip)
+ # Opening and closing a connection keeps the dummy server happy
+ # instead of timing out on accept.
+ socket.create_connection((self.client.sock.getpeername()[0], port),
+ timeout=TIMEOUT).close()
+
+ def test_makepasv_issue43285_security_enabled_default(self):
+ self.assertFalse(self.client.trust_server_pasv_ipv4_address)
+ trusted_host, port = self.client.makepasv()
+ self.assertNotEqual(
+ trusted_host, self.server.handler_instance.fake_pasv_server_ip)
+ # Opening and closing a connection keeps the dummy server happy
+ # instead of timing out on accept.
+ socket.create_connection((trusted_host, port), timeout=TIMEOUT).close()
+
def test_with_statement(self):
self.client.quit()
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-03-13-03-48-14.bpo-43285.g-Hah3.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-03-13-03-48-14.bpo-43285.g-Hah3.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..8312b7e885441
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-03-13-03-48-14.bpo-43285.g-Hah3.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+:mod:`ftplib` no longer trusts the IP address value returned from the server
+in response to the PASV command by default. This prevents a malicious FTP
+server from using the response to probe IPv4 address and port combinations
+on the client network.
+
+Code that requires the former vulnerable behavior may set a
+``trust_server_pasv_ipv4_address`` attribute on their
+:class:`ftplib.FTP` instances to ``True`` to re-enable it.

170
backport-CVE-2022-0391.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
From f4dac7ec55477a6c5d965e594e74bd6bda786903 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 09:52:36 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] [3.7] bpo-43882 - urllib.parse should sanitize urls
containing ASCII newline and tabs. (GH-25923)
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 76cd81d60310d65d01f9d7b48a8985d8ab89c8b4)
Co-authored-by: Senthil Kumaran <senthil@uthcode.com>
(cherry picked from commit 515a7bc4e13645d0945b46a8e1d9102b918cd407)
Co-authored-by: Miss Islington (bot) <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
---
Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst | 13 +++++
Lib/test/test_urlparse.py | 48 +++++++++++++++++++
Lib/urllib/parse.py | 10 ++++
.../2021-04-25-07-46-37.bpo-43882.Jpwx85.rst | 6 +++
4 files changed, 77 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-04-25-07-46-37.bpo-43882.Jpwx85.rst
diff --git a/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst b/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst
index e79faf035b06b..aea6505904be4 100644
--- a/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst
@@ -311,6 +311,9 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is
decomposed before parsing, no error will be raised.
+ Following the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, ASCII newline
+ ``\n``, ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are stripped from the URL.
+
.. versionchanged:: 3.6
Out-of-range port numbers now raise :exc:`ValueError`, instead of
returning :const:`None`.
@@ -319,6 +322,10 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
Characters that affect netloc parsing under NFKC normalization will
now raise :exc:`ValueError`.
+ .. versionchanged:: 3.7.11
+ ASCII newline and tab characters are stripped from the URL.
+
+.. _WHATWG spec: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser
.. function:: urlunsplit(parts)
@@ -660,6 +667,10 @@ task isn't already covered by the URL parsing functions above.
.. seealso::
+ `WHATWG`_ - URL Living standard
+ Working Group for the URL Standard that defines URLs, domains, IP addresses, the
+ application/x-www-form-urlencoded format, and their API.
+
:rfc:`3986` - Uniform Resource Identifiers
This is the current standard (STD66). Any changes to urllib.parse module
should conform to this. Certain deviations could be observed, which are
@@ -683,3 +694,5 @@ task isn't already covered by the URL parsing functions above.
:rfc:`1738` - Uniform Resource Locators (URL)
This specifies the formal syntax and semantics of absolute URLs.
+
+.. _WHATWG: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
index e3088b2f39bd7..3509278a01694 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
@@ -612,6 +612,54 @@ def test_urlsplit_attributes(self):
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "out of range"):
p.port
+ def test_urlsplit_remove_unsafe_bytes(self):
+ # Remove ASCII tabs and newlines from input, for http common case scenario.
+ url = "h\nttp://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "http")
+ self.assertEqual(p.netloc, "www.python.org")
+ self.assertEqual(p.path, "/javascript:alert('msg')/")
+ self.assertEqual(p.query, "query=something")
+ self.assertEqual(p.fragment, "fragment")
+ self.assertEqual(p.username, None)
+ self.assertEqual(p.password, None)
+ self.assertEqual(p.hostname, "www.python.org")
+ self.assertEqual(p.port, None)
+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "http://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
+
+ # Remove ASCII tabs and newlines from input as bytes, for http common case scenario.
+ url = b"h\nttp://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, b"http")
+ self.assertEqual(p.netloc, b"www.python.org")
+ self.assertEqual(p.path, b"/javascript:alert('msg')/")
+ self.assertEqual(p.query, b"query=something")
+ self.assertEqual(p.fragment, b"fragment")
+ self.assertEqual(p.username, None)
+ self.assertEqual(p.password, None)
+ self.assertEqual(p.hostname, b"www.python.org")
+ self.assertEqual(p.port, None)
+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), b"http://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
+
+ # any scheme
+ url = "x-new-scheme\t://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "x-new-scheme://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
+
+ # Remove ASCII tabs and newlines from input as bytes, any scheme.
+ url = b"x-new-scheme\t://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), b"x-new-scheme://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
+
+ # Unsafe bytes is not returned from urlparse cache.
+ # scheme is stored after parsing, sending an scheme with unsafe bytes *will not* return an unsafe scheme
+ url = "https://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
+ scheme = "htt\nps"
+ for _ in range(2):
+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url, scheme=scheme)
+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https")
+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "https://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
+
def test_attributes_bad_port(self):
"""Check handling of invalid ports."""
for bytes in (False, True):
diff --git a/Lib/urllib/parse.py b/Lib/urllib/parse.py
index e67d69db3614b..4f21ce784eee9 100644
--- a/Lib/urllib/parse.py
+++ b/Lib/urllib/parse.py
@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@
'0123456789'
'+-.')
+# Unsafe bytes to be removed per WHATWG spec
+_UNSAFE_URL_BYTES_TO_REMOVE = ['\t', '\r', '\n']
+
# XXX: Consider replacing with functools.lru_cache
MAX_CACHE_SIZE = 20
_parse_cache = {}
@@ -409,6 +412,11 @@ def _checknetloc(netloc):
raise ValueError("netloc '" + netloc + "' contains invalid " +
"characters under NFKC normalization")
+def _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(url):
+ for b in _UNSAFE_URL_BYTES_TO_REMOVE:
+ url = url.replace(b, "")
+ return url
+
def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
"""Parse a URL into 5 components:
<scheme>://<netloc>/<path>?<query>#<fragment>
@@ -416,6 +424,8 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
Note that we don't break the components up in smaller bits
(e.g. netloc is a single string) and we don't expand % escapes."""
url, scheme, _coerce_result = _coerce_args(url, scheme)
+ url = _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(url)
+ scheme = _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(scheme)
allow_fragments = bool(allow_fragments)
key = url, scheme, allow_fragments, type(url), type(scheme)
cached = _parse_cache.get(key, None)
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-04-25-07-46-37.bpo-43882.Jpwx85.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-04-25-07-46-37.bpo-43882.Jpwx85.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..a326d079dff4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-04-25-07-46-37.bpo-43882.Jpwx85.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+The presence of newline or tab characters in parts of a URL could allow
+some forms of attacks.
+
+Following the controlling specification for URLs defined by WHATWG
+:func:`urllib.parse` now removes ASCII newlines and tabs from URLs,
+preventing such attacks.

13
python3.spec
View File

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Summary: Interpreter of the Python3 programming language
URL: https://www.python.org/
Version: 3.7.9
Release: 19
Release: 20
License: Python
%global branchversion 3.7
@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ Patch6042: backport-36356-Fix-memory-leak-in-_asynciomodule.c-GH-165.patch
Patch6043: backport-CVE-2021-3733.patch
Patch6044: backport-CVE-2021-3737.patch
Patch6045: backport-bpo-44022-Improve-the-regression-test.patch
Patch6046: backport-CVE-2021-4189.patch
Patch6047: backport-CVE-2022-0391.patch
patch9000: Don-t-override-PYTHONPATH-which-is-already-set.patch
patch9001: add-the-sm3-method-for-obtaining-the-salt-value.patch
@ -292,6 +294,9 @@ rm Lib/ensurepip/_bundled/*.whl
%patch6043 -p1
%patch6044 -p1
%patch6045 -p1
%patch6046 -p1
%patch6047 -p1
%patch9000 -p1
%patch9001 -p1
@ -895,6 +900,12 @@ export BEP_GTDLIST="$BEP_GTDLIST_TMP"
%{_mandir}/*/*
%changelog
* Thu Feb 17 2022 shixuantong <shixuantong@h-partners.com> - 3.7.9-20
- Type:CVE
- CVE:CVE-2021-4189 CVE-2022-0391
- SUG:NA
- DESC:fix CVE-2021-4189 CVE-2022-0391
* Thu Feb 10 2022 shixuantong <shixuantong@h-partners.com> - 3.7.9-19
- Type:bugfix
- CVE:NA