From 55dc2797a066480f836baf541a9ab858d9999421 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lujingxiao <lujingxiao@huawei.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 22:12:18 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 88/94] nsenter:  clone /proc/self/exe to avoid
 exposing host binary to container

reason: There are quite a few circumstances where /proc/self/exe pointing to a
pretty important container binary is a _bad_ thing, so to avoid this we
have to make a copy (preferably doing self-clean-up and not being
writeable).

As a hotfix we require memfd_create(2), but we can always extend this to
use a scratch MNT_DETACH overlayfs or tmpfs. The main downside to this
approach is no page-cache sharing for the runc binary (which overlayfs
would give us) but this is far less complicated.

This is only done during nsenter so that it happens transparently to the
Go code, and any libcontainer users benefit from it. This also makes
ExtraFiles and --preserve-fds handling trivial (because we don't need to
worry about it).

Fixes: CVE-2019-5736
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>

Change-Id: Id54b4827173affa0f2063eef4159c87343f4d672
Signed-off-by: lujingxiao <lujingxiao@huawei.com>
---
 libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c | 236 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c        |  11 ++
 2 files changed, 247 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c

diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec383c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/sendfile.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/memfd.h>
+
+#define MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe"
+#define MEMFD_LNKNAME "/memfd:" MEMFD_COMMENT " (deleted)"
+
+/* Use our own wrapper for memfd_create. */
+#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create)
+#  define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create
+#endif
+#ifndef SYS_memfd_create
+#  error "memfd_create(2) syscall not supported by this glibc version"
+#endif
+int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags);
+}
+
+/* This comes directly from <linux/fcntl.h>. */
+#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE
+# define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024
+#endif
+#ifndef F_ADD_SEALS
+# define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
+# define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
+#endif
+#ifndef F_SEAL_SEAL
+# define F_SEAL_SEAL   0x0001	/* prevent further seals from being set */
+# define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002	/* prevent file from shrinking */
+# define F_SEAL_GROW   0x0004	/* prevent file from growing */
+# define F_SEAL_WRITE  0x0008	/* prevent writes */
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Verify whether we are currently in a self-cloned program. It's not really
+ * possible to trivially identify a memfd compared to a regular tmpfs file, so
+ * the best we can do is to check whether the readlink(2) looks okay and that
+ * it is on a tmpfs.
+ */
+static int is_self_cloned(void)
+{
+	struct statfs statfsbuf = {0};
+	char linkname[PATH_MAX + 1] = {0};
+
+	if (statfs("/proc/self/exe", &statfsbuf) < 0)
+		return -1;
+	if (readlink("/proc/self/exe", linkname, PATH_MAX) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	return statfsbuf.f_type == TMPFS_MAGIC &&
+		!strncmp(linkname, MEMFD_LNKNAME, PATH_MAX);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Basic wrapper around mmap(2) that gives you the file length so you can
+ * safely treat it as an ordinary buffer. Only gives you read access.
+ */
+static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)
+{
+	int fd;
+	char buf[4096], *copy = NULL;
+
+	if (!length)
+		goto err;
+	*length = 0;
+
+	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		goto err_free;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		int n;
+		char *old = copy;
+
+		n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (n < 0)
+			goto err_fd;
+		if (!n)
+			break;
+
+		do {
+			copy = realloc(old, (*length + n) * sizeof(*old));
+		} while(!copy);
+
+		memcpy(copy + *length, buf, n);
+		*length += n;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+	return copy;
+
+err_fd:
+	close(fd);
+err_free:
+	free(copy);
+err:
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A poor-man's version of "xargs -0". Basically parses a given block of
+ * NUL-delimited data, within the given length and adds a pointer to each entry
+ * to the array of pointers.
+ */
+static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output)
+{
+	int num = 0;
+	char *cur = data;
+
+	if (!data || *output)
+		return -1;
+
+	do {
+		*output = malloc(sizeof(**output));
+	} while (!*output);
+
+	while (cur < data + data_length) {
+		char **old = *output;
+
+		num++;
+		do {
+			*output = realloc(old, (num + 1) * sizeof(*old));
+		} while (!*output);
+
+		(*output)[num - 1] = cur;
+		cur += strlen(cur) + 1;
+	}
+	(*output)[num] = NULL;
+	return num;
+}
+
+/*
+ * "Parse" out argv and envp from /proc/self/cmdline and /proc/self/environ.
+ * This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a
+ * main() that we can just get the arguments from.
+ */
+static int fetchve(char ***argv, char ***envp)
+{
+	char *cmdline, *environ;
+	size_t cmdline_size, environ_size;
+
+	cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size);
+	if (!cmdline)
+		goto err;
+	environ = read_file("/proc/self/environ", &environ_size);
+	if (!environ)
+		goto err_free;
+
+	if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0)
+		goto err_free_both;
+	if (parse_xargs(environ, environ_size, envp) <= 0)
+		goto err_free_both;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_free_both:
+	free(environ);
+err_free:
+	free(cmdline);
+err:
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int clone_binary(void)
+{
+	int binfd, memfd, err;
+	ssize_t sent = 0;
+	struct stat statbuf = {0};
+
+	binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
+	if (binfd < 0)
+		goto err;
+	if (fstat(binfd, &statbuf) < 0)
+		goto err_binfd;
+
+	memfd = memfd_create(MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC|MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
+	if (memfd < 0)
+		goto err_binfd;
+
+	while (sent < statbuf.st_size) {
+		ssize_t n = sendfile(memfd, binfd, NULL, statbuf.st_size - sent);
+		if (n < 0)
+			goto err_memfd;
+		sent += n;
+	}
+
+	err = fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_SHRINK|F_SEAL_GROW|F_SEAL_WRITE|F_SEAL_SEAL);
+	if (err < 0)
+		goto err_memfd;
+
+	close(binfd);
+	return memfd;
+
+err_memfd:
+	close(memfd);
+err_binfd:
+	close(binfd);
+err:
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int ensure_cloned_binary(void)
+{
+	int execfd;
+	char **argv = NULL, **envp = NULL;
+
+	/* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */
+	int cloned = is_self_cloned();
+	if (cloned != 0)
+		return cloned;
+
+	if (fetchve(&argv, &envp) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	execfd = clone_binary();
+	if (execfd < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	fexecve(execfd, argv, envp);
+	return -1;
+}
diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
index 0ad6883..75211c8 100644
--- a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
+++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
@@ -432,6 +432,9 @@ void join_namespaces(char *nslist)
 	free(namespaces);
 }
 
+/* Defined in cloned_binary.c. */
+int ensure_cloned_binary(void);
+
 void nsexec(void)
 {
 	int pipenum;
@@ -447,6 +450,14 @@ void nsexec(void)
 	if (pipenum == -1)
 		return;
 
+	/*
+	 * We need to re-exec if we are not in a cloned binary. This is necessary
+	 * to ensure that containers won't be able to access the host binary
+	 * through /proc/self/exe. See CVE-2019-5736.
+	 */
+	if (ensure_cloned_binary() < 0)
+		bail("could not ensure we are a cloned binary");
+
 	/* Parse all of the netlink configuration. */
 	nl_parse(pipenum, &config);
 
-- 
2.7.4.3

